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NO SCRUTINY WHATSOEVER:
DECONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF POVERTY
LAW, DUAL RULES OF LAW,
& DIALOGIC DEFAULT
Julie A. Nice*
INTRODUCTION
Poverty Law in the United States subsists within a constitutional
framework that constructs a separate and unequal rule of law for
poor people. Across constitutional doctrines, poor people suffer
diminished protection, with their claims for liberty and equality
formally receiving the least judicial consideration and functionally
being routinely denied. As Justice Marshall succinctly put it, poor
people receive "no scrutiny whatsoever."1 This Article surveys
some doctrinal causes and systemic effects of this exclusion of poor
people from equal constitutional protection.
The classical focus of commentary regarding the intersection of
Poverty Law and Constitutional Law relates to the lack of social
welfare rights in the United States Constitution, which causes
* Delaney Professor of Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. I of-
fer my gratitude to Professors Elizabeth Cooper of Fordham, Leslie Shear, Louise
Trubek, and Marsha Mansfield of Wisconsin, Jeffrey Selbin of Berkeley, Juliet Brodie
of Stanford, and Rebecca Zietlow of Toledo for inviting me to speak on this topic, as
well as the other organizers and participants at the events where I presented various
portions of this Article, including Fordham Urban Law Journal's March 2007 Confer-
ence on Poverty Law in the Curriculum, the March 2007 Conference on the Future of
Equal Access to Civil Justice in Wisconsin (where I presented versions of The Decon-
stitutionalization of Poverty Law), and the American Association of Law School's Jan-
uary 2008 Programs on Gender and Class: Voices from the Collective (where I
presented The Hollow Hope of THE HOLLOW HOPE) and on Rights, Religion, Revolu-
tion: Theories of Advocacy for the Poor (where I presented The Gravity of Dan-
dridge). Finally, I thank my colleagues Alan Chen, Sam Kamin, Marty Katz, Viva
Moffat, Nantiya Ruan, and Joyce Sterling for their suggestions, and also the excellent
editors of the Fordham Urban Law Journal.
1. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 145 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
2. See, e.g., Peter Edelman, The Next Century of Our Constitution: Rethinking
Our Duty to the Poor, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1987); Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: On
Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969).
For a comprehensive analysis of how the Supreme Court refused to constitutionalize
social welfare rights, see ELIZABETH BUSSIERE, (DIs)ENTITLING THE POOR: THE
WARREN COURT, WELFARE RIGHTS, AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION
(1997). For a recent summary of scholarship about the lack of constitutional protec-
tion for social welfare rights, see, for example, Robin West, Katrina, the Constitution,
and the Legal Question Doctrine, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1127, 1127-28 (2006). For an
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courts to reject claims of social welfare rights. This Article does
not re-visit that debate, but instead urges greater scholarly atten-
tion to more subtle and insidious denials of equal constitutional
protection to poor people. This Article's initial claim is that Pov-
erty Law has been deconstitutionalized, that is, the courts generally
fail to enforce the Constitution's existing protections when applied
to poor people.3 A brief look at the Supreme Court's normal doc-
trinal analysis reveals how four major departures from these norms
have deconstitutionalized Poverty Law.
First, the Supreme Court normally considers claims of discrimi-
nation according to an established doctrinal analysis for determin-
ing which level of judicial scrutiny should apply. When those
affected are poor, however, the Court instead has created a unique
categorical immunization from judicial scrutiny for "social or eco-
nomic legislation."
Second, the Supreme Court normally considers whether height-
ened judicial scrutiny might be necessary because either the af-
fected group is a "suspect class" or the trait defining the affected
group is a "suspect classification." When those affected are poor,
however, the Court has circumvented these questions, never di-
rectly or adequately determining whether poor people meet the
criteria for a suspect class or whether poverty meets the criteria for
a suspect classification.
Third, when cases reveal evidence of invidious governmental dis-
crimination against other groups, the Supreme Court normally has
been willing to invalidate such governmental action by applying its
rationality review "with bite." When those affected are poor the
Supreme Court instead has applied its rationality review without
bite, that is, in a reflexive manner designed to uphold governmen-
tal regulation.
Fourth, when other groups or individuals claim infringements of
various established fundamental rights, the Supreme Court nor-
mally applies some version of heightened judicial scrutiny. When
argument that social welfare rights would be ineffective and counterproductive, see,
for example, Frank B. Cross, The Error of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 857, 863
(2001).
3. Scholars frequently use the concept of deconstitutionalization to refer to the
lack of judicial enforcement of rights. This Article uses deconstitutionalization to re-
fer to the lack of judicial enforcement of rights as well as the lack of judicial protec-
tion of classes (in this case, the class of poor people). For a recent analysis of rights-
based deconstitutionalization, see, for example, Erwin Chemerinsky, The Deconstitu-
tionalization of Education, 36 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 111 (2004) [hereinafter Chemerinsky,
Deconstitutionalization].
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those affected by the fundamental rights infringements are poor,
the Court instead has reversed its normal level of scrutiny, ratchet-
ing down from heightened scrutiny to rationality review and apply-
ing it in a reflexive manner to uphold the governmental regulation.
Over time, these forces of deconstitutionalization have con-
structed dual rules of constitutional law based on economic
means.4 On one hand is the rule of law that respects the dignity of
the haves and protects rights that benefit them, thereby perpetuat-
ing their advantages. On the other hand is the rule of law that
refuses to protect rights in a manner that might protect or benefit
the have-nots. This second-class rule of law adds insult to injury by
constantly monitoring and invading the lives of the have-nots-
comprehensively scrutinizing and regulating both their work and
family lives'-while simultaneously denying them the protection of
legal rights to defend themselves within this regulatory regime.
Both deconstitutionalization and the resulting dual rules of con-
stitutional law operate comprehensively to deny equal constitu-
tional protection to poor people. The reason the Supreme Court
has given for reflexively upholding governmental action is that ju-
dicial scrutiny is unnecessary precisely because the Justices pre-
sume any problems will be remedied within the political process.
6
Here is where the poverty paradox comes in. Not only may poor
people not expect equal constitutional protection from the judici-
ary, they also lack the types of resources typically required for ef-
fective political mobilization to pursue protection from the political
branches of government. While many impoverished individuals
have put up a valiant fight not only for economic survival but also
for greater political inclusion and protection, rarely have their ex-
4. For an earlier example of path-breaking research identifying such dual rules of
law, see, for example, Jacobus tenBroek, California's Dual System of Family Law: Its
Origin, Development, and Present Status (pts 1-3), 16 STAN. L. REV. 257 (1964), 16
STAN. L. REV. 900 (1964), and 17 STAN. L. REV. 614 (1965).
5. For a qualitative study documenting how government surveillance of poor
people has become increasingly constant and routine, see JOHN GILLIOM, OVERSEERS
OF THE POOR: SURVEILLANCE, RESISTANCE, AND THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY 1-39
(2001). See also Austin Sarat, ". . .The Law is All Over": Power, Resistance and the
Legal Consciousness of the Welfare Poor, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 343, 344 (1990)
("Law is, for most people on welfare, repeatedly encountered in the most ordinary
transactions and events of their lives.").
6. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579-80 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("Laws such as economic or tax legislation that are scrutinized under rationality re-
view normally pass constitutional muster, since 'the Constitution presumes that even
improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic processes.'
(quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985))).
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traordinary efforts proven sustainable,7 as exemplified by the de-
feat of the short-lived War on Poverty and its welfare rights
movement.8
Poor people are trapped: the courts reflexively deny their claims
that the political branches have infringed upon their equality or
liberty, and poor people otherwise lack the economic or political
leverage to persuade the political branches to end such infringe-
ments. 9 As for the possibility of scholarly progress toward framing
rights claims for poor people, several dominant views have led
most research away from constitutional rights. The first view is the
"hollow hope" critique of rights, that is, the assessment that "U.S.
courts can almost never be effective producers of significant social
reform." 10 The second view is the belief that a claim for constitu-
7. For recent descriptions of the 1960s welfare rights movement, see, for exam-
ple, FELICIA KORNBLUH, THE BATTLE FOR WELFARE RIGHTS: POLITICS AND POV-
ERTY IN MODERN AMERICA (2007); PREMILLA NADASSEN, WELFARE WARRIORS:
THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (2005); ANNELISE
ORLECK, STORMING CAESARS PALACE: How BLACK MOTHERS FOUGHT THEIR OWN
WAR ON POVERTY (2005).
8. Regarding the launching of President Johnson's War on Poverty and the
seven-year duration of the National Welfare Rights Organization, see FRANCES Fox
PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS: WHY THEY SUC-
CEED, How THEY FAIL 270, 288, 352-53 (1977). Regarding the limited success of legal
welfare rights advocacy, see BUSSIERE, supra, note 2, at 99; MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRU-
TAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1960-1973, 145 (1993);
SUSAN E. LAWRENCE, THE POOR IN COURT: THE LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM AND
SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 150 (1990); CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, COURTS
AND THE POOR 93 (1991).
9. See PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 8, at 22 ("[W]elfare administrators admon-
ish recipients for disrupting relief offices and propose instead that they learn how to
lobby in the state legislature or Congress. But welfare clients cannot easily go to the
state legislature or national capital, and when a few do, they are of course ignored.").
10. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 338 (1991). Further, Professor Rosenberg concludes: "In
general, then, not only does litigation steer activists to an institution that is con-
strained from helping them, but also it siphons off crucial resources and talent, and
runs the risk of weakening political efforts." Id. at 339. To be sure, Professor Rosen-
berg earned the widespread influence of his critique based on the rigor of his research
and cogency of his analysis. For an example of how the hollow hope critique has
influenced leading poverty law scholarship, see, for example, Matthew Diller, Poverty
Lawyering in the Golden Age, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1401, 1426 (1995) ("I agree with the
critics that the attainment of political strength provides the best, and perhaps the only,
prospect for the lasting and fundamental transformation of poor communities.").
Other poverty law scholars have departed from the hollow hope critique and perse-
vered with constitutional analysis. For analysis regarding constitutional rights for
poor people, see, for example, William E. Forbath, Caste, Class and Equal Citizenship,
98 MICH. L. REV. 1, 3 (1999); Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitu-
tions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131 (1999); Ste-
phen Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy and Constitutional Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1277
(1993); Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflecting on the Thinness of
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tional protection for poor people is either futile or unintelligible
within the logic of Supreme Court precedents.1 The third view is
acquiescence to the notion that the Supreme Court has held that
poor people are not a suspect class or that poverty is not a suspect
classification, presumably as a means to explain the patently clear
pattern of constitutional losses experienced by poor people.
1 2
Moreover, although other rights movements on the ground have
resisted these critiques by continuing to pursue constitutional liti-
gation,13 no comparable movement for constitutional rights persists
for poor people. 4
This lack of either viable constitutional or political claims, or se-
rious scholarly frames, for rights of inclusion for poor people has
resulted in what I term a dialogic default-a failure to contest eco-
nomic injustice within constitutional and political discourse.15 The
Constitutional Law, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 410 (1993). For a comparative constitutional
perspective, see, for example, MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JU-
DICIAL REVIEW AND SOCIAL WELFARE RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (2008).
11. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Foreword: The Court's Agenda-and the Na-
tion's, 120 HARV. L. REV. 4, 44-46 (2006) (arguing that involving the Supreme Court
in making major social policy decisions is a "counterfactual" that "remains well
outside the realm of even remotely possible constitutional change"). Judging by a
number of reactions to presentations of this paper, even some scholars sympathetic to
those who struggle for economic survival resist returning to a call for constitutional
rights, whether due to perceived futility or persistent fatigue. As one friend and pov-
erty law colleague put it, "I don't want to talk about Dandridge." While the reasons
for this plea are certainly understandable, this Article suggests that justice for poor
people demands deconstruction of how Dandridge v. Williams has deconstitutional-
ized Poverty Law, and the dialogic consequences that have followed. To put it an-
other way, Dandridge is to the deconstitutionalization of economic justice as Plessy v.
Ferguson was to the deconstitutionalization of racial justice. Acquiescing to Dan-
dridge is to the peril of poor people in much the same way that acquiescing to Plessy
was to the peril of African-Americans. See infra Part I.A.
12. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
785-787 (3d ed. 2006) [hereinafter CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW].
13. Rights movements persist regarding, for example, race, sex, sexual orientation,
age, and disability.
14. t do not mean to discount the importance of those constitutional challenges
brought on behalf of poor people, but I believe they are too few to constitute a rights
movement. Nor do I underestimate the crucial work done by legal services agencies
or other advocacy organizations such as the Sargent Shriver National Center on Pov-
erty Law, Children's Defense Fund (CDF), Center for Budget and Policy Priorities
(CBPP), and the Center for Law and Social Policy (CLASP), to name only a few,
which help on a daily basis to stem the tide of the regulatory welfare regime.
15. In their recent comprehensive review of data produced about welfare reform,
Joel Handler and Yeheskel Hasenfeld demonstrate that the political obsession with
ending welfare as we know it diverted attention from the problem of poverty, which
then virtually disappeared from political discourse. See JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHES-
KEL HASENFELD, BLAME WELFARE, IGNORE POVERTY AND INEQUALITY 1 (2007):
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immediate consequence of this dialogic default is the lack of trac-
tion toward establishing even the aspiration to greater constitu-
tional protection for those most economically vulnerable.1 6 This
default is costly. 7 The evolution of constitutional law teaches the
importance of rights claims in shaping constitutional interpretation,
with history demonstrating the extension of the Constitution's pro-
tection to those previously excluded classes that persistently dared
to claim rights.18 As this Article recounts, recent scholarly research
regarding both constitutional theory19 and social movement mobili-
zation20 has underscored the rights movements' role in shaping
accord Erik Eckholm, Childhood Poverty Is Found to Portend High Adult Costs, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 25, 2007, at A19 ("For more than 10 years, lawmakers had mainly focused
on sweeping welfare changes passed in 1996 that imposed time limits and strict work
requirements on welfare recipients. In the process, Democratic staff members in the
House and Senate said this week, other crucial poverty-related topics were
neglected.").
16. Such an aspiration toward a positive constitutional scheme has been imagined
with regard to the general welfare. See, e.g., SOTIRIOs A. BARBER, WELFARE & THE
CONSTITUTION (2003).
17. These costs are not only dialogic, but also are economic. See Eckholm, supra
note 15, at A19 ("Children who grow up poor cost the economy $500 billion a year
because they are less productive, earn less money, commit more crimes and have
more health-related expenses .... ).
18. To take one prominent example, Reva Siegel has shown how the movement
for an Equal Rights Amendment, though technically unsuccessful, contributed to the
Supreme Court's transition to applying heightened scrutiny for reviewing claims of
discrimination based on sex. Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement
Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the de facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV.
1323, 1323 (2006).
19. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 174 (1991);
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998); LARRY KRAMER,
THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
(2004); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS
(1999); Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577 (1993);
Barry Friedman, The Importance of Being Positive: The Nature and Function of Judi-
cial Review, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1257 (2004); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular
Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and Judicial Supremacy, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1027
(2004); Mark Tushnet, Forms of Judicial Review as Expressions of Constitutional Patri-
otism, 22 LAW & PHIL. 353 (2003).
20. Among legal scholars, see, for example, Jack M. Balkin, How Social Move-
ments Change (Or Fail to Change) the Constitution: The Case of the New Departure,
39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 27 (2005); William N. Eskridge, Channeling: Identity-Based
Social Movements and Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419 (2001); Edward L. Rubin,
Passing Through the Door: Social Movement Literature and Legal Scholarship, 150 U.
PA. L. REV. 1 (2001). Among law and society scholars, see, for example, CHARLES
Epp, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND SUPREME COURTS IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1998); MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY
EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION (1994) [hereinafter
MCCANN, RIGHTS]. For compilations of interdisciplinary literature, see LAW AND SO-
CIAL MOVEMENTS (Michael McCann ed., 2006); THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule & Hanspeter Kriesi eds., 2006).
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constitutional interpretation. Because constitutional discourse is a
crucial arena of struggle for questions of justice, a default in the
constitutional dialogue signals a broader default in the political
contest for economic justice.2' In a more practical sense, both
deconstitutionalization and the resulting dialogic default have left
Poverty Law itself as a frontier for endless experimentation with
the lives of poor people, at best,22 or as an accomplice to their
21. Joel Handler's new book documents how "[w]elfare has dropped out of the
political discourse and is virtually forgotten. Unfortunately, discussion of poverty and
inequality has nearly disappeared as well-even though significant poverty remains,
especially child poverty, and inequality has been increasing over the past few de-
cades." HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 15, at 1. For scholarly analysis of the
persistence of poverty, see CHARLES KARELIS, THE PERSISTENCE OF POVERTY: WHY
THE ECONOMICS OF THE WELL-OFF CAN'T HELP THE POOR X (2007).
Relevant data have been compiled by the economist Thomas Hertz and pub-
lished in Unequal Chances: Family Background and Economic Success, ed-
ited by Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis, and Melissa Osborne Groves
(Princeton and Oxford, 2005). These data show that children born in the
lowest 10 percent of families ranked by income have a 51 percent probability
of ending up in the lowest 20 percent as adults. Roughly speaking, this
means that people born very poor face a greater than even chance of ending
up moderately or very poor. More striking still, African Americans born
very poor have a greater than 40 percent chance of being not just moderately
poor but very poor as adults.
Id. For a recent policy analysis of how to reduce poverty, see generally CENTER FOR
AMERICAN PROGRESS, FROM POVERTY TO PROSPERITY: A NATIONAL STRATEGY TO
CUT POVERTY IN HALF 1-72 (2007).
22. See, e.g., ROBIN H. ROGERS-DILLON, THE WELFARE EXPERIMENTS: POLITICS
AND POLICY EVALUATION (2004). In Promoting Marriage Experimentation: A Class
Act?, 24 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 31 (2007), I examine empirical data regarding class-
based experimentation with marriage. President Bush pledged $1.5 billion federal
dollars in 2004 to promote marriage, mostly targeted at poor people. Id. at 35. This
promotion ignored the available data that had shown, first, that marriage needs no
public relations campaign because poor women already place marriage on a pedestal
but have difficulty affording it, and second, that the overall body of data did not sup-
port a conclusion of a causal link between marriage and the reduction of poverty. Id.
at 37-42. As of 2005, eighty million dollars in government funds were allocated for
further study of marriage promotion for impoverished individuals, including major
longitudinal research experiments. Id. at 39. As this expensive experimentation with
promoting marriage continues, the federal government simultaneously continues to
enforce what amounts to a marriage-penalty-a more stringent ninety percent work-
rate for two-parent families receiving Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (com-
pared to fifty percent for other families). Id. at 32, 36. So the promotional campaigns
seem largely rhetorical, highly unlikely to be effective in reducing poverty, and con-
tradicted by other policies that effectively have restored the historic discouragement
of welfare receipt by two-parent families. I conclude that "[flailure to evaluate the
marriage promotion experiments based on whether they decrease poverty effectively
reduces welfare recipients to mere social science guinea pigs, a phenomenon that is
constitutionally allowed precisely because of their class." Id. at 45.
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economic exploitation, at worst.23
Like the contradictions between the rhetoric of equality in the
Declaration of Independence and the reality of oppression embed-
ded in the original Constitution, as well as between the Fourteenth
Amendment's promise of equal protection under the law and the
Supreme Court's historic refusal to enforce it, this separate and un-
equal rule of law for poor people stands in stark defiance of the
Constitution's commitment to equal protection under the law.
Part I of this Article broadly surveys the deconstitutionalization
of Poverty Law, identifying four types of departures from normal
constitutional doctrine for claims affecting poor people. The first
departure is the categorical immunization of "social or economic
legislation." The second departure is the circumvention of suspect
class or classification analysis. The third departure is the applica-
tion of rationality review in a reflexive manner to uphold govern-
mental regulation. The fourth departure is the reversal of the
normal level of judicial scrutiny for infringements of established
fundamental rights, ratcheting down from heightened scrutiny to
reflexive rationality review. Part II explores how this deconstitu-
tionalization of Poverty Law has contributed to the construction
and perpetuation of dual rules of law, one superior set of rules for
the economic haves and an inferior set of rules for the economic
have-nots. Part III then examines how both dialogic constitutional
theory and social movement mobilization scholarship predict the
resulting dialogic default: the stagnation caused by the absence of
rights claims for poor people in constitutional and political dis-
course. Finally, Part IV considers the current opportunity for the
mutually constitutive activities of claiming legal rights and mobiliz-
ing political support.
23. As Joel Handler and Yeheskel Hasenfeld summarize the current situation:
"Nearly a third (32%) of American workers earn less than $15,000 per year, with an
additional 20 percent earning between $15,000 and $25,000." HANDLER &
HASENFELD, supra note 15, at 325. As they further note: "One of the great myths
about the low-wage labor market is that it is a stepping stone to better and more
stable employment. The reality is far more complex, and in fact, the majority of those
employed in the low-wage labor market remain there, stuck with low-wage jobs, have
few if any benefits, and experience considerable job instability and insecurity." Id. at
239. See JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT
RIGHTS 35 (2005); KATHERINE S. NEWMAN, CHUTES AND LADDERS: NAVIGATING
THE Low-WAGE LABOR MARKET 41-42 (2006); WILLIAM P. QUIGLEY, ENDING POV-
ERTY As WE KNOW IT: GUARANTEEING A RIGHT TO A JOB AT A LIVING WAGE 85-
89 (2003).
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I. DECONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF POVERTY LAW
This section examines how the Supreme Court has deconstitu-
tionalized Poverty Law. In short, the Court treats constitutional
challenges to governmental actions affecting poor people as sub-
stantively non-justiciable. In other words, it treats existing consti-
tutional protections, when applied to poor people, as effectively
"exempt from judicial enforcement."24 The Supreme Court has ac-
complished this deconstitutionalization of Poverty Law through
four departures from established constitutional doctrine. These
four departures include: (1) categorical immunization of "social or
economic legislation"; (2) circumvention of normal suspect class or
classification analysis; (3) application of rationality review in a re-
flexive manner to uphold governmental action; and (4) reversal of
normal heightened scrutiny for infringements of established funda-
mental rights when those affected are poor. These four departures
will be examined in turn.
A few preliminary points help to frame this section on deconsti-
tutionalization. First, deconstitutionalization of Poverty Law is not
necessitated by the absence of social welfare rights, as the Supreme
Court long ago repudiated reliance on a specious distinction be-
tween rights and privileges. 25 Second, the Supreme Court has con-
ceded that the reason for not applying heightened scrutiny is the
fact that the disproportionate burdens carried by poor people are
deeply embedded throughout our legal system.26 This presents a
tautology, of course, as the fact that violations of constitutional
protections are widespread hardly can suffice as an answer to why
the judiciary fails to redress them. Third, while some might argue
24. Mark Tushnet, Social Welfare Rights and the Forms of Judicial Review, 82 TEX.
L. REV. 1895, 1898 (2004).
25. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n.6, 638 (1969) (invalidating
one-year residency requirement for welfare benefits and explaining that the "constitu-
tional challenge cannot be answered by the argument that public assistance benefits
are a 'privilege' and not a 'right"'); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (in-
validating denial of unemployment benefits to claimant who refused to work on Sat-
urday due to her religious beliefs based in part on reasoning that: "Nor may the
South Carolina court's construction of the statute be saved from constitutional infir-
mity on the ground that unemployment compensation benefits are not appellant's
'right' but merely a 'privilege.' It is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of
religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions
upon a benefit or privilege.").
26. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976) (rejecting heightened scru-
tiny for cases challenging disparate racial impact because such scrutiny "would raise
serious questions about ... a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory,
and licensing statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor and to the average
black than to the more affluent white").
2008]
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that many laws burdening poor people apply equally to the rest of
us, the Supreme Court has rejected the logic that equal application
suffices to immunize the government from judicial scrutiny.27 Fi-
nally, unless the Supreme Court means to imply that poor people
are not included in constitutional protections of equality and lib-
erty or that somehow it is not possible for the government to dis-
criminate against poor people or infringe on their fundamental
rights, constitutional questions that arise in the realm of Poverty
Law should be as substantively justiciable as those affecting other
groups defined by other traits.
A. Categorical Immunization of "Social
or Economic Legislation"
The first method of deconstitutionalization is the Court's cate-
gorical immunization of social or economic legislation. The primary
instrument of this deconstitutionalization is Dandridge v. Wil-
liams, in which the Supreme Court broadly declared that only the
most deferential form of rationality review would be applied to re-
view governmental actions regarding the category of economics
and social welfare.
Dandridge represents a significant departure from the Supreme
Court's normal doctrinal analysis designed to assess the constitu-
tionality of any governmental reliance on a classification that treats
similarly situated people differently. Regardless of the type of reg-
ulation at issue, the Supreme Court normally reviews challenges to
governmental discrimination by considering whether either the dis-
advantage of the affected class or the irrelevance of the trait
makes the class or classification "suspect. ' '29 Dandridge mandated
instead that allegations of discrimination regarding one particular
type of regulatory field-economics and social welfare-would be
treated differently than allegations of discrimination regarding
27. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964) ("Judicial inquiry
under the Equal Protection Clause, therefore, does not end with a showing of equal
application among the members of the class defined by the legislation. The courts
must reach and determine the question whether the classifications drawn in a statute
are reasonable in light of its purpose-in this case, whether there is an arbitrary or
invidious discrimination between those classes covered by Florida's cohabitation law
and those excluded.").
28. 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970).
29. The Supreme Court famously described legal restrictions burdening a racial
group, for example, as "immediately suspect" and subject to "the most rigid scrutiny"
in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
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other types of regulatory fields. 30 By limiting judicial review of this
category to its most deferential rationality review,3' the Court
uniquely and categorically immunized the government's social or
economic regulation from heightened scrutiny and its greater like-
lihood of judicial invalidation.
One need only examine the Court's application of its most defer-
ential rationality review in Dandridge to understand how effec-
tively it immunizes the government. Dandridge involved
Maryland's rule of a maximum grant to families receiving welfare,
thus disadvantaging larger families compared to smaller ones.32
The Court found two legitimate state interests to be sufficient to
justify the maximum grant. The first interest, encouraging employ-
ment, was accepted even though the Court conceded that Mary-
land's rule affected some large welfare families that did not include
any employable person, as the plaintiffs did not, and that Mary-
land's rule failed to subject small welfare families to this employ-
ment incentive.33 In other words, the Court accepted the
sufficiency of a state regulation that was both over-inclusive and
under-inclusive. Also, the Court approved a second state interest,
avoiding discrimination between welfare families and working poor
families.34 It accepted this interest without citing evidence in the
legislative record that would demonstrate Maryland's maximum
grant was adopted in fact because of this concern, and without cit-
ing any analysis of the data that would show the amount of the
maximum grant had any actual relationship to the amount received
30. In the words of Justice Marshall, the decision signaled the Court's "emascula-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause" and its "sweeping refusal to accord the Equal
Protection Clause any role in this entire area of the law," due to which he filed a
dissent that Justice Brennan joined. Interestingly, Justice Harlan, in concurrence, also
indicated that he declined to join the categorical part of the majority's reasoning.
Justice Harlan expressed his reservation about "certain implications that might be
drawn from the opinion" and specified that his basis for joining the majority was "not
because this case involves only interests in 'the areas of economics and social welfare
.... .Id  at 489-90 (Harlan, J., concurring).
31. The Supreme Court left no question in Dandridge that the level of scrutiny
would be its most deferential to the government. In a few short paragraphs, the Court
specified that the government's social or economic classifications could be "imper-
fect," need not be made "with mathematical nicety," and may be "illogical" and "un-
scientific." The Court further specified that such regulation would be upheld so long
as "any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it." Dandridge, 397 U.S.
at 485.
32. See id. at 474-75.
33. See id. at 486-87.
34. See id. at 486.
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by workers earning the minimum wage." Instead, as Justice Mar-
shall noted in dissent, "the State virtually conceded that it set out
to limit the total cost of the program along the path of least resis-
tance. '3 6 Finally, the Court also invoked both federalism and sepa-
ration of powers concerns, noting repeatedly that the federal courts
have no power to impose their views of wise economic or social
policy on the states.37
Perhaps Dandridge merely reflects the Supreme Court's commit-
ment, established in the wake of Lochner's38 demise, to allow the
government to wield broad regulatory power over so-called social
or economic legislation. Does this arc of history serve to rescue
Dandridge by making it seem less of an aberration? A closer ex-
amination here suggests not. Consider two early decisions from
the 1940s. The Supreme Court first used the phrase "social or eco-
nomic legislation" in 1942 in upholding a state's taxation of estate
wealth upon death. Justice Douglas reasoned for the majority: "It
would violate the first principles of constitutional adjudication to
strike down state legislation on the basis of our individual views or
preferences as to policy, whether the state laws deal with taxes or
other subjects of social or economic legislation. 39
What might Justice Douglas have meant to include in this cate-
gory of "social or economic legislation"? Justice Douglas's stalwart
concurrence in a landmark Poverty Law case just the prior year
sheds considerable light on his meaning. Justice Douglas joined
35. The majority dropped a footnote specifying the federal and state minimum
wages without analysis of their relationship to the amount of the maximum grant. Id.
at 486 n.19.
36. Id. at 529.
37. See id. at 486 (describing the rational basis test as "a standard that is true to
the principle that the Fourteenth Amendment gives the federal courts no power to
impose upon the States their views of what constitutes wise economic or social pol-
icy"); id. at 487 ("[Tlhe intractable economic, social, and even philosophical problems
presented by public welfare assistance programs are not the business of this
Court .. "); id. ("[T]he Constitution does not empower this Court to second-guess
state officials charged with the difficult responsibility of allocating limited public wel-
fare funds among the myriad of potential recipients.").
38. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (invalidating regulations pertain-
ing to labor conditions for bakers).
39. State Tax Comm'n of Utah v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174, 181 (1942). This New
Deal-era skirmish over estate taxes reflects the malleability of separation of powers
arguments, with Justice Frankfurter arguing in concurrence that: "whether a tax is
wise or expedient is the business of the political branches of government, not ours."
Id. at 184 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Jackson responded in dissent that "this
Court owes all that it has of wisdom and power" to resolve the "jurisdictional snarl"
regarding estate taxes because the answer is not found in the Constitution's text. Id.
at 185, 201 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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the Court's invalidation of California's criminal prohibition against
bringing an indigent person into the state.4 0 He wrote separately to
underscore his view that having different levels of constitutional
protection depending on economic means would constitute a
"caste system," which would clearly violate the Constitution.41 It
seems specifically unlikely, then, that Justice Douglas would have
intended to allow unequal constitutional protection for poor peo-
ple when he coined the "social or economic legislation" phrase in
upholding a so-called "death tax" the following year.42
Between the New Deal and the early end of the War on Poverty,
punctuated decisively by Dandridge in 1970, the Supreme Court
invalidated several governmental regulations burdening poor peo-
ple by taking into consideration the actualities of poverty43 and
holding that government cannot condition important benefits on
40. In its unanimous decision in Edwards v. California, the Supreme Court poign-
antly acknowledged how economic reality affected its constitutional interpretation,
noting that the decade of the Great Depression was "marked by a growing recogni-
tion that in an industrial society the task of providing assistance to the needy has
ceased to be local in character" and that "in not inconsiderable measure the relief of
the needy has become the common responsibility and concern of the whole nation."
The Court concluded, "we do not think that it will now be seriously contended that
because a person is without employment and without funds he constitutes a 'moral
pestilence.' Poverty and immorality are not synonymous." Edwards v. California, 314
U.S. 160, 174-75, 177 (1941) (invalidating California's criminal prohibition against
bringing an indigent person into the state).
41. Id. at 181 (Douglas, J., concurring). As Justice Jackson put it in his separate
concurrence, "[w]e should say now, and in no uncertain terms, that a man's mere
property status, without more, cannot be used by a state to test, qualify, or limit his
rights as a citizen of the United States." Id. (Jackson, J., concurring).
42. A little more than a month after Justice Douglas first used the phrase "social
or economic legislation" in Aldrich, he used the phrase "strict scrutiny" for the first
time in his majority opinion for a unanimous Court in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535, 541 (1942). The Skinner Court invalidated Oklahoma's version of a three-strikes
law authorizing sterilization of those habitually convicted of crimes involving "moral
turpitude." Justice Douglas focused his analysis on the governmental discrimination
between the person who steals chickens and the clerk who embezzles: "Sterilization of
those who have thrice committed grand larceny with immunity for those who are
embezzlers is a clear, pointed, unmistakable discrimination." Id. The Skinner opinion
again confirms Justice Douglas's pattern of applying strict scrutiny, rather than ration-
ality review, to governmental discrimination based on poverty.
43. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 23-24 (1956) (Justice Frankfurter argu-
ing that the "law addresses itself to actualities. It does not face actuality to suggest
that Illinois affords every convicted person, financially competent or not, the opportu-
nity to take an appeal, and that it is not Illinois that is responsible for disparity in
material circumstances. Of course a State need not equalize economic conditions ....
If it has a general policy of allowing criminal appeals, it cannot make lack of means an
effective bar to the exercise of this opportunity.").
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one's ability to pay.44 Comparing two case examples from this pe-
riod sheds additional light on the categorical "social or economic"
exception to normal judicial scrutiny.
One sleeper case decided in 1955, Williamson v. Lee Optical,4 5
stands now as the prototype for the run-of-the-mill business regula-
tion for which the Court insists on deference to legislative judg-
ments. Justice Douglas, writing for a unanimous Court, applied
rationality review quite deferentially to uphold Oklahoma's law
prohibiting opticians from providing eyeglass lenses without a pre-
scription from an opthalmologist or optometrist. He specified "the
law need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to
be constitutional. ' 46 Harkening back to the Lochner era, he chas-
tised that the "day is gone" when the Court should strike down
business regulations as unwise.47
It is telling that the very next year in Griffin v. Illinois, the Court
did not invoke this clearly established form of deferential rational-
ity review in considering the constitutionality of the cost barrier
facing indigent defendants attempting to file criminal appeals.48
The Court conceded that the Constitution did not require states to
provide either appellate courts or criminal appellate review, so it
declined to base its decision on a fundamental rights analysis.49 A
majority agreed, nonetheless, that once a state provides appellate
review, denying such review on account of poverty would consti-
tute invidious discrimination.50 As Justice Black wrote in announc-
ing the Court's judgment: "There can be no equal justice where the
kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has."'51
Thus, the deferential rationality review that Justice Douglas and
the Court applied just the year before, to uphold regulations of
opticians, was simply nowhere to be found in the Court's rebuke of
discrimination based on poverty in Griffin.
44. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Grif-
fin, 351 U.S. at 12.
45. 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) ("'For protection against abuses by legislatures the
people must resort to the polls, not to the courts."') (citations omitted).
46. Id. at 487-88.
47. Id. at 488.
48. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 23-24.
49. The Griffin Court's view that the appropriate constitutional analysis was about
equal access, and not about any fundamental liberty or right of access per se, was
reaffirmed forty years later at the end of a lengthy re-examination by Justice Scalia in
his majority opinion in Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 368-78 (1996).
50. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 18.
51. Id. at 19. See also id. at 23-24 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (calling such a
"money hurdle" implemented by the government a "squalid discrimination").
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Taken together, it becomes clear that Justice Douglas marked
the category of "social or economic legislation" to defer to govern-
mental regulation of those interests very well represented in the
political process, such as those holding estate wealth and those
practicing licensed professions, but he specifically refused to apply
it elsewhere in a manner harmful to those most economically vul-
nerable. In nearly thirty years following Justice Douglas's first use
of the "social or economic legislation" category, he never used it to
uphold governmental discrimination based on poverty. Indeed, he
sometimes used rationality review deferentially to uphold govern-
mental regulation of wealth in such a manner that instead ad-
vanced the cause of economic justice. 2 In short, there seems to be
no question that Justice Douglas, who originally invoked deferen-
tial rationality for "social or economic" legislation, did not include
discrimination based on poverty within that category. 3 Therefore,
linking the category of social or economic legislation with defer-
ence to governmental action designed primarily to reduce the costs
of protecting those most economically vulnerable seems downright
subversive, if not deeply ironic.
In several "outlier" decisions since Dandridge, the Supreme
Court occasionally has invalidated governmental regulation in so-
cial or economic arenas even when no established suspect class or
fundamental right was involved.54 As I have suggested elsewhere,
52. See State Tax Comm'n of Utah v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174, 181 (1942).
53. For other confirming examples showing that Justice Douglas used the Equal
Protection Clause to invalidate discrimination based on poverty, see, for example,
Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71-72 (1968) (arguing that latitude for social and eco-
nomic legislation is not appropriate when reviewing an invidious classification, and
applying what resembles rationality review with bite to invalidate a classification of
non-marital children, even though the classification had "history and tradition on its
side"); Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966) (closely
scrutinizing and invalidating a state poll tax even though the Constitution does not
expressly protect the right to vote in state elections because "[w]ealth, like race,
creed, or color, is not germane to one's ability to participate intelligently in the electo-
ral process").
54. See, e.g., M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 128 (1996) (invalidating Mississippi's
dismissal of indigent mother's appeal of the termination of her parental rights due to
her failure to pay appellate fees); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-18 (1982) (invalidat-
ing Texas's denial of free public education to undocumented immigrant children).
Justice O'Connor subsequently described Plyler as not fitting the "pattern" of al-
lowing heightened scrutiny only when the government has infringed a fundamental
right or discriminated against a suspect class. See Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Sch.,
487 U.S. 450, 457-59 (1988). For a closer examination of how M.L.B., Plyler, and
other outlier decisions by the Supreme Court can be understood as reflecting the
mutually constitutive relations between rights and classes, see Julie A. Nice, The
Emerging Third Strand in Equal Protection Jurisprudence: Recognizing the Co-Con-
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one possible explanation is that the Court understands the mutu-
ally constitutive nature of equality and liberty, and therefore is sus-
picious of governmental actions that in effect make it more difficult
for members of disadvantaged groups to engage in activities that
are especially important to helping them protect and advance their
interests.
Regardless of some outlier exceptions, the gravity of Dandridge
was simply enormous. It extinguished the hope that poor people
would receive meaningful constitutional protection. Its force con-
tinues to this day. As a doctrinal matter, Dandridge set the prece-
dent that immunizes the government's economic and welfare
policies from heightened scrutiny or any real threat of invalidation.
As a dialogic matter, it stifles the prospect of meaningful dialogue
about any proper scope of the so-called welfare state.5 6 As a prac-
tical matter, it leaves those most economically vulnerable outside
the Constitution's protection.57
B. Circumvention of Normal Suspect Class
or Classification Analysis
For other disadvantaged groups claiming a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause, the Supreme Court generally has considered
whether the group meets the criteria for a "suspect class," meaning
that the group has suffered historical discrimination, is unable to
protect itself in the political process, and is defined by a trait that is
immutable or very difficult to change.58 The Court also has consid-
ered whether the trait defining the group is relevant to an individ-
ual's ability to perform or contribute to society, and, if not, treats
stitutive Nature of Rights and Classes, 99 U. ILL. L. REV. 1209, 1226 (1999) [hereinaf-
ter Nice, Emerging Third Strand].
55. Nice, Emerging Third Strand, supra note 54, at 1218.
56. In the famous words of Justice Stewart, "the intractable economic, social, and
even philosophical problems presented by public welfare assistance programs are not
the business of this Court." Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970).
57. Dandridge leaves matters of the welfare state virtually unchecked by the judi-
ciary, even though those affected are the most economically vulnerable and are with-
out power to either bargain with the government or withstand government pressure.
58. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439-47 (1985)
(analyzing factors to determine whether developmentally disabled persons are a sus-
pect class); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976)
(analyzing factors to determine whether older persons are a suspect class); Frontiero
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-87 (1973) (analyzing factors to determine whether
women are a suspect class).
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any stereotypical reliance on such trait as a "suspect
classification. 5
9
Because of the categorical immunization of "social or economic
legislation," the Supreme Court arguably has never needed to
reach and decide the question of whether a classification distin-
guishing on its face between poor people and non-poor people was
sufficiently "suspect" to trigger heightened judicial scrutiny. More-
over, the major Poverty Law cases the Court has considered have
not directly presented discrimination between poor and non-poor
people, but instead mostly have involved discrimination among
subgroups of poor people. With regard to various classifications
not facially discriminating on poverty but nonetheless alleged to
have a disproportionate impact on poor claimants, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly asserted that it has never held that poverty is
a suspect classification. Various feedback loops have repeated this
dictum-that poverty has never been held to be a suspect classifi-
cation-to such an extent that they have made it seem as if the
direct question had been reached and decided. Legal scholars as
well as courts have acquiesced in treating this dictum as a
holding.60
Tracking the original source of the Supreme Court's supposed
holding that poverty is not a suspect classification leads back to
frequently-quoted dicta from a canon of cases. Not long after the
Court directly suggested it would generally apply heightened scru-
tiny to wealth or poverty classifications, 61 the Court quickly
backpedaled. In three subsequent cases the Court examined gov-
ernment classifications that discriminated among types of poor
families but did not present comparisons between poor and non-
poor families. As we have seen, the Supreme Court in Dandridge
v. Williams 62 famously upheld Maryland's maximum welfare grant
that disproportionately burdened larger poor families as compared
to smaller poor families. The Court declared that "social and eco-
nomic legislation" would be subjected only to the most deferential
59. See, e.g., Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686; United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515
(1996).
60. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, Deconstitutionalization, supra note 3, at 121.
61. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966) ("Wealth, like
race, creed, or color, is not germane to one's ability to participate intelligently in the
electoral process. Lines drawn on the basis of wealth or property, like those of race,
are traditionally disfavored. To introduce wealth or payment of a fee as a measure of
a voter's qualifications is to introduce a capricious or irrelevant factor.").
62. 397 U.S. at 485 (applying rationality review to legislation relating to "econom-
ics and social welfare").
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form of rationality review. Similarly, a pair of abortion funding
decisions compared poor women who sought funding for abortion
with other poor women who received funding for childbirth. In
Maher v. Roe,63 the Court accurately stated that it had "never held
that financial need alone identifies a suspect class for equal protec-
tion analysis. 64 Three years later in Harris v. McRae,65 the Su-
preme Court asserted, more problematically, that it had "held
repeatedly that poverty, standing alone, is not a suspect classifica-
tion. ' 66 In support of this statement, the Court cited only to James
v. Valtierra.67 But James also did not involve a classification distin-
guishing between poor and non-poor persons.
In James, the Supreme Court upheld a voter initiative that
amended California's constitution to require local majority voter
approval prior to construction of low-rent housing. The Court's
majority ignored Justice Marshall's dissenting argument that Cali-
fornia's law singled out poor people as a class, and instead defined
the relevant class as "persons advocating low-income housing '68
and upheld the law. This broader framing of the affected class did
not blunt Justice Marshall's ultimate complaint that the majority
had applied "no scrutiny whatsoever ' 69 in upholding the law.
Similarly, another case sometimes cited for the proposition that
poverty is not a suspect classification is San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez.7 ° But Rodriguez also did not involve
a comparison between poor and non-poor persons. In Rodriguez,
the Court considered the constitutionality of public school funding
in Texas that arguably advantaged students in school districts with
more taxable wealth and disadvantaged students in school districts
with less taxable wealth. The Supreme Court refused to assume
that the poorest students were concentrated in the poorest school
63. 432 U.S. 464, 471 (1977).
64. Id. at 471 ("In a sense, every denial of welfare to an indigent creates a wealth
classification as compared to nonindigents who are able to pay for the desired goods
or services. But this Court has never held that financial need alone identifies a sus-
pect class for purposes of equal protection analysis." (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973) and Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471
(1970))).
65. 448 U.S. 297 (1980), reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 917 (1980).
66. Id. at 323 (citing James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971)).
67. 402 U.S. at 141.
68. Id. at 142.
69. Id. at 145 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
70. See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 373-74 (1996) (citing San Antonio In-
dep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 19 (1973)).
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districts71 and emphasized "the absence of any evidence that the
financing system discriminates against any definable category of
'poor' people. '7 2 As a result, the Court defined the class at issue as
"unified only by the common factor of residence in districts that
happen to have less taxable wealth than other districts."73 None-
theless, the Court speculated, in a dictum, that lawyers for plaintiffs
probably had not relied on a wealth discrimination theory "in rec-
ognition of the fact that this Court has never heretofore held that
wealth discrimination alone provides an adequate basis for invok-
ing strict scrutiny. 74
The critical distinction is between the accurate statement-that
the Court has not held poor people to be a suspect class or poverty
to be a suspect classification-and the inaccurate assertion that the
Court has reached and decided that poverty is not a suspect classi-
fication or that poor people are not a suspect class. Instead, the
Court effectively has avoided reaching the question at least in part
because the facts of these cases did not require it to do so. These
cases involved discrimination based on family size (between larger
and smaller families in Dandridge), reproductive choice (between
funding childbirth and abortion in Maher and Harris), advocacy of
low-income housing (between those for and against it in James),
and taxable school district wealth (Rodriguez), none of which di-
rectly raised the question of the constitutionality of discriminating
based on poverty or between poor and non-poor persons. 75 Al-
71. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 23 ("[T]here is no basis on the re-
cord in this case for assuming that the poorest people-defined by reference to any
level of absolute impecunity-are concentrated in the poorest districts.").
72. Id. at 25.
73. Id. at 28.
74. Id. at 29.
75. Another case cited for the proposition that only rationality review applies is
Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 660-61 (1973) (per curiam), which rejected a chal-
lenge to the state's filing fee required for appellate review of a reduction of welfare
benefits. See Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 487 U.S. 450, 461 (1988) (noting
that Ortwein applied only rationality review). Ortwein was decided by a per curiam
summary affirmance, issued without the benefit of full briefing and oral argument.
See Ortwein, 410 U.S. at 666 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Because I am not ready to
decide that question summarily, sub silentio, and without the benefit of full briefing
and oral argument, I must dissent from the Court's decision."). The per curiam opin-
ion in Ortwein invoked Dandridge and its categorical exclusion described above, to
wit: "this litigation, which deals with welfare payments, 'is in the area of economics
and social welfare."' Id. at 660. The per curiam opinion did not address whether
poor people are a suspect class or whether poverty is a suspect classification, but
merely asserted: "[n]o suspect classification, such as race, nationality, or alienage is
present. The applicable standard is that of rational justification." Id. As the Supreme
Court subsequently explained, Ortwein involved discrimination between welfare
2008]
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though Rodriguez came the closest because it directly compares
the poverty of one school district with the wealth of another, the
Court there painstakingly explained why it refused to treat the case
as presenting a wealth-based classification.76
This level of doctrinal nitpicking matters because the Supreme
Court simply has never grappled with whether poor people meet
the indicia of a suspect class, nor with whether poverty is irrelevant
to ability or merit such that it should be treated as a suspect classi-
fication. During the New Deal era reversal, repudiating the judici-
ary's prior heightened scrutiny of economic regulation, the
Supreme Court famously noted that "prejudice against discrete
and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seri-
ously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily
to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly greater searching judicial inquiry.' ' 77 The Court
has not given actual consideration to whether poor people meet
the suspect class criteria or whether they need judicial protection
because they have suffered historical discrimination, are unable to
protect themselves in the political process, and find it difficult or
sometimes impossible to reduce their poverty-especially given re-
cent data demonstrating the difficulty of an impoverished child es-
caping poverty as an adult.78  Nor has the Court determined
whether poverty is such an inadequate proxy for ability as to be
claimants appealing adverse agency hearings for which Oregon did not allow waiver
of fees, and poor people bringing other types of civil appeals such as terminations of
parental rights for which Oregon did allow in forma pauperis waiver of fees. See
M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 115-16 (1996). Thus, like other cases described in the
text, Ortwein involved discrimination among poor people, not between poor and non-
poor people. The weakness of Ortwein as a precedent was reflected most recently
when a majority of the Supreme Court did not address Ortwein in invalidating the
federal condition prohibiting lawyers employed by Legal Services Corporation grant-
ees from challenging welfare laws. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533,
548 (2001) (concluding "[t]he attempted restriction is designed to insulate the Gov-
ernment's interpretation of the Constitution from judicial challenge. The Constitu-
tion does not permit the Government to confine litigants and their attorneys in this
manner"). Moreover, Justice Scalia mentioned Ortwein only briefly in his dissent. Id.
at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
76. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 22-27.
77. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). The
Court subsequently invoked the famous reasoning of footnote four of Carolene Prod-
ucts, for example, when it considered whether it should depart from Dandridge ra-
tionality and grant heightened scrutiny to persons age fifty and over by considering
whether older people comprise a "discrete and insular" group that needed "extraordi-
nary protection from majoritarian political process." See Massachusetts Bd. of Re-
tirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1976) (citing Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at
152-53 n.4).
78. See Eckholm, supra note 15; KARELIS, supra note 21.
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irrelevant, or whether reliance on stereotyping about poor people
reflects bare prejudice, and thus makes suspect any classification
according to poverty.79
C. Application of Rationality Review in a Reflexive Manner
Until the Supreme Court extends heightened scrutiny to poor
people, might rationality review that is extremely deferential to the
government nonetheless afford sufficient constitutional protection
for poor people? This depends on how the Court applies it. For
some "discrete and insular minorities,"80 such as hippies,81 disabled
people, 82 and gay people,83 the Supreme Court has applied its ra-
tionality review with bite,84 and has invalidated governmental ac-
tions burdening these groups. Such meaningful review has not
been afforded to poor people. Instead, and again presumably be-
cause of its categorical exception for "social or economic legisla-
tion," the Supreme Court has emphasized that regulations affecting
poor people should receive only minimal rationality review, mean-
ing extreme deference to the government, which will rarely result
in invalidation.85 As a result, poor people are left with no judicial
scrutiny to smoke out and protect them from invidious discrimina-
tion. In other words, when applying rationality review to poor peo-
ple, the Supreme Court has applied it reflexively, that is
mechanically, and routinely has upheld governmental actions that
burden those living in poverty.
As a result of Dandridge, courts typically apply the most highly
deferential form of rationality review when Equal Protection chal-
79. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973). If courts ever directly ana-
lyze the criteria for suspect class or classification, they might be hard-pressed to deny
that "our Nation has a long and unfortunate history" of discrimination against poor
people, who still face "pervasive, although at times more subtle, discrimination," and
that imposing disadvantage based on "the accident of birth" into a poverty-stricken
family would be illogical and unjust. Id. at 684. See also Weber v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
80. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152.
81. U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1973).
82. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 435 (1985).
83. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 626-27 (1996).
84. See, e.g., Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 84 (2000) (explaining
that because classifications subjected to the Dandridge rationality review test are
"presumptively rational," then "the individual challenging its constitutionality bears
the burden of proving that the 'facts on which the classification is apparently based
could not reasonably be conceived to be true by the governmental decisionmaker"').
85. See CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 12, at 678 ("The Su-
preme Court generally has been extremely deferential to the government when apply-
ing the rational basis test .... The result is that it is very rare for the Supreme Court
to find that a law fails the rational basis test.").
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lenges require examination of governmental actions regulating the
lives of poor people. The effect of what Justice Marshall once char-
acterized as "no scrutiny whatsoever ' 86 is to immunize welfare reg-
ulation not only from judicial invalidation but also from
meaningful judicial scrutiny. If a regulation affecting poor people
is challenged in the courts, the burden on attorneys representing
the political branches is merely to imagine some legitimate govern-
ment purpose that the regulation conceivably might serve. 7
To put it another way, other groups receiving only rationality re-
view have enjoyed some judicial protection when the Court has
applied its test with bite. Poor people have not enjoyed the bene-
fits of the Court's bite, but instead routinely lose their challenges
because review of their claims has been limited to the reflexive ver-
sion of rationality review, in other words, "no scrutiny whatso-
ever." This general lack of meaningful constitutional protection
leaves those most economically vulnerable subject to the whims of
the political branches of government, which enjoy great Oleference
to exercise the same broad regulatory power over poor people as
over run-of-the-mill business enterprises.88
D. Reversal of Normal Heightened Scrutiny
for Fundamental Rights
The argument thus far has related to the Supreme Court's
deconstitutionalization of Poverty Law within the context of the
Equal Protection doctrine. The specific argument has been that
the Supreme Court fails or refuses to enforce existing constitu-
tional protections when applied to poor people due to three types
of departures from its doctrinal norm. These three departures have
included categorical immunization of social or economic legisla-
tion, circumvention of normal suspect class analysis, and applica-
tion of rationality review in a reflexive manner. Might poor people
nonetheless receive protection of established rights guaranteed by
other constitutional provisions? The Supreme Court normally ap-
plies some version of heightened judicial scrutiny to enforce estab-
lished constitutional rights, regardless of the nature of the class
86. See James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 145 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (dis-
agreeing with the Supreme Court majority's refusal to invalidate a state constitutional
provision that required low-rent housing to be approved by a majority of local voters
and arguing that the Supreme Court majority chose "to subject the article to no scru-
tiny whatsoever" and treat it "as if it contained a totally benign, technical economic
classification").
87. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993).
88. See Loffredo, supra note 10, at 1278.
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asserting an infringement. But, again, the Court has departed from
its normal use of heightened scrutiny for alleged infringements of
established constitutional rights when those affected are poor.
With regard to fundamental rights, this fourth type of departure
occurs when the Court reverses its normal heightened scrutiny and
substitutes the reflexive version of rationality review, or when it
invokes heightened scrutiny but actually applies rationality review
in a reflexive manner to uphold the government's action.
An alternative way to frame this type of departure is that the
Court has allowed the government to require a waiver of constitu-
tional rights in exchange for welfare benefits. Much scholarly ink
has been spilled about the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions
and its application in the social welfare arena.8 9 While not all of it
can be surveyed here, it might be helpful to highlight several sali-
ent examples. The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions states
that the government may not do indirectly (e.g., via conditions)
what it may not do directly (e.g., via prohibitions). Professor Kath-
leen M. Sullivan has argued that the government should refrain
from exercising coercive influence over a benefit recipient when
the government enjoys monopoly power over the benefit and also
when the government has contributed to the recipient's depen-
dency on the benefit. She has analyzed how welfare benefits are a
paradigmatic example of both of these circumstances. 9°
Other scholars have examined how the Court has circumvented
other existing constitutional protections by attaching conditions to
government benefits. With regard to reproductive and family au-
tonomy, for example, Professor Susan Frelich Appleton's work has
led a parade of scholars who have critiqued the Court's double
standard that affords heightened scrutiny for Substantive Due Pro-
cess challenges to protect the choices of women who are not poor
but effectively reverses its scrutiny to the reflexive version of ra-
tionality review to decline to protect the choices of women who are
poor.91 In my prior work, I have documented the double standard
89. In my view, Professor Kathleen Sullivan's trenchant analysis set the template
in the area of social welfare. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions,
102 HARV. L. REV. 1415, 1472-73 (1989).
90. Id. at 1452-54.
91. See Susan Frelich Appleton, Beyond the Limits of Reproductive Choice: The
Contributions of the Abortion-Funding Cases to the Fundamental-Rights Analysis and
to the Welfare-Rights Thesis, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 721, 746-57 (1981); Susan Frelich
Appleton, Standards for Constitutional Review of Privacy-Invading Welfare Reforms:
Distinguishing the Abortion-Funding Cases and Redeeming the Undue-Burden Test, 49
VAND. L. REV. 1, 17-22, 25 (1996).
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of the Court's application of heightened scrutiny to Establishment
Clause and Takings challenges affecting non-poor people as com-
pared to the reflexive version of rationality review for welfare re-
cipients.92 Other scholars and I have critiqued the lack of
enforcement of the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition of invol-
untary servitude with regard to those who work at the very bottom
of the labor force.93 Thus with regard to both work and family, an
enormous body of scholarly literature identifies and critiques such
double standards, usually related to a specific doctrinal area of con-
stitutional law.
For a recent example demonstrating just how little has changed
for welfare recipients and illustrating how the double standard cre-
ates dual rules of constitutional law, one need look no further than
the Ninth Circuit's recent decision upholding San Diego County's
draconian program that permits snooping in welfare applicants'
homes for evidence of fraud or other criminal activity as a condi-
tion of eligibility. 94 San Diego County requires an unannounced
home "walk-through" to gather information confirming the
amount of assets claimed, the presence of an eligible dependent
child, an actual residence in California, and the actual absence of
92. See Julie A. Nice, Making Conditions Constitutional by Attaching Them to Wel-
fare: The Dangers of Selective Contextual Ignorance of the Unconstitutional Condi-
tions Doctrine, 72 DENY. U. L. REV. 971, 986-87 (1995); see also S. Elise Kert, Bowen
v. Gilliard: Out of the Mouths of Babes and Into the Government Coffers, 14 J. CON-
TEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 399, 401-02, 406 (2003) (poor families suffer material conse-
quences, for example, as a result of the government's "taking" of child support to
repay welfare expenditures). See, e.g., Erik Eckholm, Parents Scrimp as States Take
Child Support, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2007, at Al.
Close to half the states pass along none of collected child support to families
on welfare, while most others pay only $50 a month to a custodial parent,
even though the father may be paying hundreds of dollars each month. Crit-
ics say using child support to repay welfare costs harms children instead of
helping them, contradicting the national goal of strengthening families, and
is a flaw in the generally lauded national campaign to increase collections.
Id.
93. For an exploration of how workfare or the exploitation of other low-wage
workers might violate the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition against involuntary ser-
vitude, see, for example, RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS
(2007); Baher Azmy, Unshackling the Thirteenth Amendment: Modern Slavery and a
Reconstructed Civil Rights Agenda, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 981 (2002); Risa L.
Goluboff, The Thirteenth Amendment and the Lost Origins of Civil Rights, 50 DUKE
L.J. 1609 (2001); Julie A. Nice, Welfare Servitude, 1 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY
340 (1994); Maria L. Ontiveros, Immigrant Workers' Rights in a Post-Hoffman
World-Organizing Around the Thirteenth Amendment, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 651
(2005); Lea VanderVelde, The Thirteenth Amendment of Our Aspirations, 38 U. TOL.
L. REV. 855 (2007).
94. Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916, 931 (9th Cir. 2006).
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any "absent parent. ' 95 The Ninth Circuit panel's majority con-
ceded that investigators from the District Attorney's office conduct
the walk-through, carry their official peace officer badges but not
weapons,96 and that the investigators are "trained to look for items
in plain view," and "make referrals for criminal investigation if, for
example, they discover evidence of contraband, child abuse, or a
subject with outstanding felony warrants. '97 The panel majority
also conceded that the Supreme Court has "repeatedly held that
consensual administrative searches qualify as searches under the
Fourth Amendment, even though refusal to consent carried no
criminal penalty and the searches were not part of a criminal inves-
tigation." 98 The panel majority nonetheless held that the Supreme
Court's prior decision in Wyman v. James, upholding "rehabilita-
tive" home visits for welfare recipients, directly controlled their
conclusion that the Sanchez walk-through was not a search, even
though the Wyman home visit was "rehabilitative" rather than in-
vestigative, and even though Wyman was decided before the Su-
preme Court's more recent string of Fourth Amendment decisions
holding that similar fraud investigations for people who are not
poor constituted searches. 99
The Sanchez majority did not hide their specific reliance on the
fact that those subjected to the walk-through were welfare recipi-
ents.100 Comparing the welfare walk-through to the Supreme
Court's decision upholding warrantless searches for convicted
criminals, the majority openly argued, "a person's relationship with
the state can reduce that person's expectation of privacy even
within the sanctity of the home." '' Next, the majority asserted
that verification of residence for welfare recipients is a reasonable
means "to ensure that funds are properly spent.' 0 2 Finally, they
relied on the county's requirement that the welfare recipient give
"express consent" for the walk-through, and claimed that the dis-
sent's concerns about coercion were dismissed in Wyman because
"nothing of constitutional magnitude is involved.'' 0 3
95. Id. at 918-19.
96. Id. at 919.
97. Id. at 919 n.3.
98. Id. at 922 n.8.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 926 (requiring San Diego County to identify a "valid 'special need"'
because the walk-through was not primarily for general law enforcement purposes).
101. Id. at 927.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 927 n.15.
2008]
FORDHAM URB. L.J.
The dissenting judge on the Sanchez panel emphasized that Wy-
man was factually distinguishable, especially because it involved a
rehabilitative visit by a social assistance caseworker, and that the
panel majority's reasoning contradicted the Supreme Court's post-
Wyman interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. In an impas-
sioned dissent to the Ninth Circuit's en banc denial of a rehearing,
seven Ninth Circuit judges dissented.104 Judge Pregerson, writing
for the seven dissenters, argued that the panel majority's decision
"clings to Wyman v. James," "ignores over thirty-five years of inter-
vening law," and ignores the differences in the "quality and charac-
ter" of the Wyman and Sanchez programs. 10 5 The en banc
dissenters emphasized that there could be no true consent where
applicants "are not given notice of when the visit will occur; they
are not informed of their right to withhold consent; they are told
the visit is mandatory; and they are aware of the severe conse-
quences of refusing the search. ' 10 6 Most importantly for purposes
here, the en banc dissenters recognized the double Fourth Amend-
ment standard at work:
We do not require similar intrusions into the homes and lives of
others who receive government entitlements. The government
does not search through the closets and medicine cabinets of
farmers receiving subsidies. They do not dig through the laundry
baskets and garbage pails of real estate developers or radio
broadcasters. The overwhelming majority of recipients of gov-
ernment benefits are not the poor, and yet this is the group we
require to sacrifice their dignity and their right to privacy. 0 7
Sanchez is simply one recent example of how the courts reverse
scrutiny when those affected are poor by refusing to apply the nor-
mal heightened scrutiny otherwise associated with various existing
constitutional protections. This example also reveals how deconsti-
tutionalization tends to construct a dual rule of law for the eco-
nomic haves and have-nots. As the en banc dissenting judges in
Sanchez described it, subjecting the have-nots to a different Fourth
104. Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 483 F.3d 965, 966 (9th Cir. 2007).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 968.
107. Id. at 969. For similar analysis of the double standard in Sanchez, see Recent
Cases, Constitutional Law-Fourth Amendment-Ninth Circuit Upholds Conditioning
Receipt of Welfare Benefits on Consent to Suspicionless Home Visits-Sanchez v.
County of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2006), 120 HARV. L. REV. 1996, 1998-
2003 (2007); Adam Liptak, Full Constitutional Protection for Some, but No Privacy for
the Poor, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2007, at A9; Editorial, A Loss for Privacy Rights, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 28, 2007, at A26.
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Amendment than the one that protects the haves is "nothing less
than an attack on the poor.1 °8
II. DUAL RULES OF LAW
According to Jacobus tenBroek, arguably the most original con-
stitutional Poverty Law scholar of the twentieth century, unequal
enforcement of existing constitutional protections for poor peo-
ple-in other words, deconstitutionalization-has constructed dual
rules of law for the economic haves and have-nots. As an example,
tenBroek's famous trilogy of articles meticulously demonstrated
how dual rules of law have differently regulated the family lives of
people who are poor as compared with the rest of us.'0 9 As ten-
Broek put it, the two systems of family law are:
different in origin, different in history, different in substantive
provisions, different in administration, different in orientation
and outlook. One is public, the other private. One deals with
expenditure and conservation of public funds and is heavily po-
litical and measurably penal. The other deals with the distribu-
tion of family funds, focuses on the rights and responsibilities of
family members, and is civil, nonpolitical, and less penal. One is
for underprivileged and deprived families; the other for the
more comfortable and fortunate. n °
Professor tenBroek's path breaking research about dual rules of
family law sparked a scholarly symposium and an edited volume of
essays on Poverty Law in 1966."' Described by tenBroek as barely
beginning to determine the myriad ways the separate legal rules for
poor people might violate the Constitution,112 this volume sur-
veyed the unique, recurring legal problems facing poor people and
also included essays challenging tenBroek's critique and explicitly
108. Sanchez, 483 F.3d at 966 (Pregerson, J., dissenting) ("[A]llowing this opinion
to stand is an assault on our country's poor as we require them to give up their rights
of privacy in exchange for essential public assistance.... This case is nothing less than
an attack on the poor."), denying reh'g, 464 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2006) (upholding
mandatory investigative home visits of welfare recipients as not violating the Fourth
Amendment), cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 649 (2007).
109. See tenBroek, supra note 4. Professor Joel Handler edited and reprinted ten-
Broek's articles in a separate volume, published a few years after tenBroek's death in
1968. See FAMILY LAW AND THE POOR: ESSAYS BY JACOBUS TENBROEK (Joel Han-
dler ed., 1971).
110. tenBroek, supra note 4, at 257-58.
111. See THE LAW OF THE POOR (Jacobus tenBroek & Cal. L. Rev. eds., 1966).
Funding and support for this project was provided by the Center for the Study of Law
and Society at the University of California.
112. See id. at vii.
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defending such "dual systems" of law. 113 Thus, at the moment of
Professor tenBroek's untimely death in 1968, the conversation
about what he called "substantive equal protection" had gained
considerable momentum. Two years later, Dandridge put a stop to
it.
Has the conversation regarding dual rules of law for the haves
and have-nots ended because such separate systems have been
abolished? The recent Sanchez decision, discussed previously,
makes clear this is not the case. For mothers receiving welfare, the
government's historic search for a man in the house as a basis for
denying welfare has not changed much," 4 except that it is now
framed as a fraud investigation for failure to report the presence of
an absent parent. Although general concern about the potential of
fraud is not a sufficient basis for invading the privacy of most
Americans under the Fourth Amendment, it has been accepted as
sufficient when the home being invaded belongs to a poor mother
receiving welfare to help support her family. This is what dual
rules of law look like today, which is barely different from what
tenBroek described.
Since Dandridge, the Supreme Court has rejected many constitu-
tional claims brought by poor people who, for the most part now,
have stopped bringing them. As welfare reform progresses, the
government continues to subject the family and work lives of those
most economically vulnerable to systematic regulation, with few if
any constitutional challenges protecting either their liberty or
equality.
It is precisely this largely abandoned project of exposing the pat-
tern of dual rules of law to which I urge scholars to return. As
prior sections revealed, poor people routinely receive the very least
judicial consideration when governmental actions burden them,
which is in actuality no scrutiny whatsoever. Moreover, when gov-
ernmental actions infringe established constitutional rights de-
signed to protect liberty, poor people do not receive the same
benefit of heightened scrutiny otherwise granted to the haves. The
bottom line is, except for a few outlier cases,1 15 poor people simply
do not receive equal judicial consideration or application of the
113. Thomas P. Lewis & Robert J. Levy, Family Law and Welfare Policies: The
Case for "Dual Systems" and Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Dual Systems of Family Law: A
Comment, in THE LAW OF THE POOR 424, 457 (Jacobus tenBroek & Cal. L. Rev. eds.
1966).
114. See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 309 (1968).
115. For a closer examination of many of these outlier cases, see, for example, Nice,
Emerging Third Strand, supra note 54.
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Constitution's protections. As Justice O'Connor reminded us, the
very reason the courts defer to the political branches is because
they presume those branches will remedy any problems. 116 For
poor people, this presumption is sorely misplaced. Indeed, the
hope of political protection for poor people may be at least as
hollow as the hope of judicial protection.
III. DIALOGic DEFAULT
The deconstitutionalization of Poverty Law and resulting dual
rules of law for the economic haves and have-nots contribute to the
overall dialogic default that has occurred on the question of eco-
nomic justice. American exceptionalism is marked in part by this
absence of any serious dialogue about a collective or governmental
duty to the economic have-nots. As the earlier sections of this Ar-
ticle reveal, the absence of social welfare rights is not the only way
that poor people are burdened here more than in most of the other
so-called western industrialized democracies. Hidden beneath the
absence of social welfare rights is the broader acquiescence of al-
lowing the have-nots to bear the costs of governmental actions that
disparately, and sometimes uniquely, burden them.
How does a dialogic default in constitutional discourse matter? I
suggest much insight can be obtained by connecting two strands of
scholarship themselves separated in a dialogic divide between
those who study constitutional interpretation from within the legal
academy and those who study rights, litigation, and social move-
ments from within the interdisciplinary law-and-society tradition.
First, from within the legal academy, much recent constitutional
theory has focused on the dialogic role of constitutional law. For
constitutional law scholars, the notion of some back-and-forth be-
tween the Supreme Court's interpretations of the Constitution and
those preferred by the political branches is common. Those in the
trenches of a social movement seeking to persuade the judiciary to
interpret the Constitution in accordance with the movement's pref-
erences certainly might presume, intend, or at the very least hope,
that their work will affect the courts. According to many promi-
nent constitutional theorists, dialogue is exactly what the Constitu-
tion produces and reflects.
116. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579-80 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Laws
such as economic or tax legislation that are scrutinized under rationality review nor-
mally pass constitutional muster, since 'the Constitution presumes that even improvi-
dent decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic processes.'" (citation
omitted)).
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The various dialogic theorists each tend to use their own termi-
nology to explain how the courts are in conversation with the other
branches of the federal government, the states, and the people
about the meaning of the Constitution. Jacobus tenBroek provides
an early account of the dialogic theory in his book meticulously
documenting how arguments from the abolitionist movement were
translated into constitutional terms and subsequently adopted by
the leaders of Congress in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.117 One account of evolutionary change in constitutional in-
terpretation compares it to the development of the common law. 118
Other more empirical research documents how the Court tends
over time to reflect changes in societal consensus on constitutional
questions.119 Some scholars previously associated with critical legal
studies have made a surprisingly realist argument that the Consti-
tution is no less enmeshed in politics than is the rest of law, 120 as
well as a normative argument that the people have every right to
117. See JACOBUS TENBROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 183-91 (1951). In the summer of 1953, Thurgood Marshall, then chief
counsel to the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, wrote to
Professor tenBroek to inform him that he and his research team had "taken full ad-
vantage" of tenBroek's book in preparation for the re-arguments in Brown v. Board
of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). FLOYD MATSON, BLIND JUSTICE: JACOBUS TEN-
BROEK AND THE VISION OF EQUALITY 117 (2005). Professor tenBroek also foreshad-
owed with uncanny prescience how equal protection theory would emerge from this
history and how its doctrine would develop in the future. See Joseph Tussman &
Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341, 343, 352,
379-81 (1949). For example, he plucked the Supreme Court's nod to "rigid scrutiny"
of "suspect" racial restrictions in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216
(1944), and reframed the analysis as "suspect classification." Id. at 356. Long before
Professor Charles Reich's famous article on The New Property, Professor tenBroek
predicted that:
whatever our past or present preferences, it is certain that a concern with
equality will be increasingly thrust upon us. We have tended to identify lib-
erty with the absence of government; we have sought it in the interstices of
the law. What happens, then, when government becomes more ubiquitous?
Whenever an area of activity is brought within the control or regulation of
government to that extent equality supplants liberty as the dominant ideal
and constitutional demand.
Id. at 380. He powerfully concluded: "The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment appears thus to be entering the most fruitful and significant period of its
career. Virtually strangled in infancy by post-civil-war judicial reactionism, long frus-
trated by judicial neglect, the theory of equal protection may yet take its rightful place
in the unfinished Constitutional struggle for democracy." Id. at 381.
118. See David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114
HARV. L. REV. 1457, 1468-69 (2001).
119. See Friedman, supra note 19.
120. See Mark Tushnet, Popular Constitutionalism as Political Law, 81 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 991, 995-96 (2006).
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assert their views of constitutional meaning.121 Other critics have
articulated a "relational" process of "responsive interpretation' 1 22
or cultural constitutionalism. 123 Still others have decried the anti-
democratic nature of either "judicial unilateralism," when the
courts end the dialogue prematurely by deciding disputes still being
debated in society, 24 or "partisan entrenchment," when the politi-
cal parties seek to influence the dialogue's outcome by putting par-
tisan judges on the federal courts. 125  Another prominent
interpretation surmises that the Supreme Court engages in mo-
ments of higher lawmaking by ratifying shifts in constitutional in-
terpretation that are signaled politically by the people. 26 While
these dialogic theories differ in many details, what they have in
common is an understanding of constitutional interpretation as dy-
namic rather than static and influenced by an interactive public
discourse.127
A separate strand of empirical and historical law-and-society
scholarship examining the role of rights, courts, and/or social
movements strongly supports this strand of constitutional theo-
rizing. Mirroring their foundational insight that law and society in-
ter-relate in a mutually constitutive manner, much of this research
reflects both the tension and synergy between legal rights and so-
cial movements. Stuart Scheingold's somewhat paradoxical thesis
set the template for the eclectic body of interdisciplinary research
that has emerged. Scheingold first critiqued the American "myth
of rights" for failing to produce much meaningful social change,
but also identified in this persistent belief in rights the possibility of
121. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITU-
TIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 246-47 (2004).
122. See ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMU-
NITY, MANAGEMENT 35-50 (1995).
123. Robert C. Post, Foreword, Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts,
and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (2003) ("I shall argue that constitutional law and
culture are locked in a dialectical relationship, so that constitutional law both arises
from and in turn regulates culture.").
124. See JEFFREY ROSEN, THE MOST DEMOCRATIC BRANCH: HOW THE COURTS
SERVE AMERICA 8, 17, 198-99 (2006). For a similar analysis exploring how Justice
John M. Harlan viewed the courts as "subject to a form of democratic correction," see
Bruce Ledewitz, Justice Harlan's Law and Democracy, 20 J.L. & POL. 373, 374 (2004).
125. See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional
Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1068 (2001) (arguing "partisan entrenchment" influ-
ences judicial appointments, which shape constitutional interpretation).
126. See ACKERMAN, supra note 19.
127. See Tushnet, supra note 120, at 997-1001 (noting that across history, this dia-
logue has taken different forms, has occurred in longer and shorter time frames, and
has been terminated by different actors who signaled that the conversation was over).
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a "politics of rights" by which social movements might leverage
legal rights as a means of mobilizing support for desired social
change.2
8
One of the most impressive progeny in this vein of research is
political scientist Michael McCann's pioneering study of rights pur-
sued by the pay equity movement. McCann's systematic, qualita-
tive study provided strong empirical evidence of the importance of
rights in developing consciousness of inequality, creating a com-
mon identity among those affected, organizing and mobilizing
them to assert rights as remedies, and cultivating a greater sense of
inclusion and empowerment.129 McCann concludes that legal
rights are not fixed, but instead are "subject to constant battles
over official enforcement, extension to different relational con-
texts, and substantive reformulation by variously situated
citizens.' '1 30
Beyond his impressive empirical study showing how such nebu-
lous phenomena may be studied systematically, McCann's broader
contribution has been to synthesize the larger body of relevant re-
search1 31 to develop a theoretical framework for understanding the
interplay between social movements and law, and to organize the
many areas where additional research is needed. 132 His knowledge
and synthesis of existing research is analytically insightful and prac-
tically very helpful. McCann identifies two general types of re-
search: first, evaluating the use of legal action for direct effects of
winning cases and setting precedents; and, second, exploring the
128. STUART SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY,
AND POLITICAL CHANGE 5-6 (1974).
129. See MCCANN, RIGHTS, supra note 20, at 304. In a subsequent reflection on the
implications of this empirical study, Professor McCann noted that nearly all of the pay
equity participants he interviewed "confirmed the pivotal catalytic role of legal action
in movement evolution. This effective mobilization was achieved despite the fact that
courtroom victories were few, were narrowly tailored, and never achieved the judicial
legitimation of comparable worth theory under federal law that activists desired."
LAW AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 15 (Michael McCann, ed., 2006) [hereinafter Mc-
CANN, LAW AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS].
130. MCCANN, RIGHTS, supra note 20, at 304.
131. See MCCANN, LAW AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 129, at xv-xvi. Pro-
fessor McCann provides a wonderfully concise summary of relevant law-and-society
scholarship in his introduction to the compilation of essays he edited.
132. Regarding future research, McCann cautioned that legal norms "neither guar-
antee justice nor are they simply obstacles and diversions to the pursuit of a more just
society," and therefore he urged scholars "neither to celebrate nor to dismiss rights
strategies in the abstract," but instead to study closely the use of rights in a variety of
contexts to develop a deeper understanding of how the politics of rights advocacy
informs "the actual process of democratic change itself." MCCANN, RIGHTS, supra
note 20, at 309-10.
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indirect effects of "catalyzing movement building efforts, generat-
ing public support for new rights claims, or providing pressure to
supplement other political tactics." '33 Focusing on these under-
theorized indirect effects, he offers a typology that tracks the pro-
cedural stages of building a movement, negotiating policy reform,
implementing policy reform, and establishing the legacy of policy
reform.
134
The synthesis of current research about building a movement is
especially relevant here. McCann examines the initial develop-
ment of an agenda, observing that this may occur in either the neat
manner of translating existing political demands into rights claims,
or the messier process of gradually conceiving of new rights claims
while grappling with the meaning and implications of extant legal
rules.' 35 Agenda development specifically implies that engaging in
legal rights advocacy itself holds a generative capacity from which
new rights claims may emerge. McCann identifies the second stage
as "generating mass involvement," which involves building a con-
stituent base of those who are directly affected and others who sup-
port their cause, by raising awareness, increasing expectations
about remedies, and forging a common identity among these con-
stituents.136 According to McCann, extensive empirical evidence
confirms the role of rights rhetoric and legal advocacy in these
stages of movement development. 137
McCann acknowledges that legal rights do not always succeed in
building a movement or increasing public support. 138 Borrowing
from Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward's classic study of
poor people's movements, McCann agrees that the impact of rights
on movement development is "delimited by the social struc-
ture.' 39 He further incorporates social science theories positing
that these limits derive from availability of "structural opportuni-
ties" for collective action, especially changes or strains in political
133. MCCANN, LAW AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 129, at 8. For an in-
depth and nuanced study tracking the direct effects of a United States Supreme Court
decision ordering metropolitan-wide housing desegregation, see LEONARD S. RuI-
NOWITZ & JAMES E. ROSENBAUM, CROSSING THE CLASS AND COLOR LINES: FROM
PUBLIC HOUSING TO WHITE SUBURBIA (2000).
134. MCCANN, LAW AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 129, at 9.
135. Id. at 10-11.
136. Id. at 12.
137. Id. at 13.
138. Id. at 14 ("The actual impact of such legal tactics and rights appeals has proved
to be highly uneven in different struggles, of course.").
139. Id. at 17 (quoting FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, POOR PEO-
PLE'S MOVEMENTS: WHY THEY SUCCEED, How THEY FAIL 3 (1977)).
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or economic circumstances, 140 and also capacity for "resource mo-
bilization," especially the existence of movement leaders and orga-
nizational ties.141
While McCann does not assume that rights are a panacea, he
explains rights are "both a resource and a constraint,' 42 perhaps
especially for those most disadvantaged. He writes: "Given the
overwhelming systemic inequalities and scarcities in basic re-
sources that oppress subordinate groups, even limited, contingent,
uncertain resources such as our legal traditions offer should be
appreciated. ,143
So how might a claim of rights matter? Rights might constitute
inclusion, as articulated by Professor Kim Crenshaw in her now-
classic defense of the civil rights movement against the Critical Le-
gal Studies critique:
The expression of rights, however, was a central organizing fea-
ture of the civil rights movement. Because rights that other
Americans took for granted were routinely denied to Black
Americans, Blacks' assertion of their 'rights' constituted a seri-
ous ideological challenge to white supremacy. Their demand
was not just for a place in the front of a bus, but for inclusion in
the American political imagination. In asserting rights, Blacks
defied a system which had long determined that Blacks were not
and should not have been included. Whether or not the exten-
sion of these rights has ultimately legitimated the subordinate
status of Blacks, the use of rights rhetoric was a radical, move-
ment-building act. 144
According to Crenshaw and other identity scholars, rights claims
are about inclusion. As McCann and other social movement re-
searchers have shown, inclusion is both a cause and effect of mobil-
ization. Adding the primary agreement of the dialogic
140. MCCANN, LAW AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 129, at 17 ("It is pre-
cisely this context of increased hardship, denied entitlements, and expanded opportu-
nities for creative action that social movement theorists often see as most ripe for
collective citizen mobilization around new rights claims.").
141. Id. at 18. For a confirmation of the resources associated with claiming rights
and mobilizing support based on comparative empirical data, see CHARLES Epp, THE
RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARA-
TIVE PERSPECTIVE (1998).
142. MCCANN, LAW AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 129, at 6.
143. MCCANN, RIGHTS, supra note 20, at 309.
144. Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transforma-
tion and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1364-65
(1988) (citations omitted). For a comprehensive examination, see MARTHA MINOW,
MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW
(1990).
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constitutional theorists, judicial interpretation responds to the
pressures social movements claiming rights in the dialogic process
exert, a process which gradually shapes constitutional meaning.
Taken together, these theories reveal what it means both legally
and politically for poor people to suffer the absence of both rights
claims 145 and movement mobilization: they effectively are denied
both the defense of constitutional rights protections by the judici-
ary and the offense of pursuing protection in the political process.
Moreover, it is not only each of these separately that is absent, but
also the mutually reinforcing interactions between these synergistic
methods of leveraging toward greater inclusion for poor people.
IV. THE CO-CONSTITUTIVE RELATION BETWEEN CLAIMING
RIGHTS & MOBILIZING SUPPORT
Every now and then, moments in time present themselves when
the conditions seem right for either mobilizing politically or claim-
ing rights legally. Yet, as Piven and Cloward so astutely warned in
their classic analysis:
Opportunities for defiance are not created by analyses of power
structures. If there is a genius in organizing, it is the capacity to
sense what it is possible for people to do under given conditions,
and to then help them do it. In point of fact, however, most
organizing ventures ask that people do what they cannot do, and
the result is failure.
146
Piven and Cloward thus remind us that organizing is, like claim-
ing rights, "delimited by the social structure.' 47  If Piven and
145. For an excellent empirical examination of how the absence of social rights
discourse has made it difficult to make political progress toward obtaining govern-
mental assistance to meet long-term care needs, see Sandra R. Levitsky, Private Di-
lemmas of Public Provision: The Formation of Political Demand for State
Entitlements to Long-Term Care 112 (2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univer-
sity of Wisconsin, Madison) (on file with author) (concluding "[i]f in this case
caregivers had recourse to a resonant social rights frame, their claims might have chal-
lenged us to develop new ways of conceptualizing citizenship, community, and social
responsibilities of care. In the absence of a resonant social rights discourse,
caregivers' claims challenge us to do something substantially less: to ensure only that
our most basic needs are met by family, with help when absolutely necessary from the
state.").
146. PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 8, at 22.
147. Id. at 3 ("The occasions when protest is possible among the poor, the forms
that it must take, and the impact it can have are all delimited by the social structure in
ways which usually diminish its extent and diminish its force."). Calling the point that
opportunities are delimited by the social structure their first main argument, Piven
and Cloward add a second point especially important for present purposes: "It is our
second general point, then, that the opportunities for defiance are structured by fea-
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Cloward, McCann, and other empirical researchers are correct,
then organizing or otherwise mobilizing support and rights advo-
cacy relate in a mutually constitutive manner. This suggests that
the key may be to develop conditions for both movement mobiliz-
ing and legal leveraging, and also to make the best use of those
conditions whenever they occur.
148
Are the conditions now ripe for mutually constitutive movement
mobilization and rights advocacy? At this particular moment in
American history, poverty is making a rare appearance as an ur-
gent concern on the political radar screen. In the midst of the cam-
paign for the 2008 presidential election, poverty has been included
on the stump by most Democratic candidates, with former Senator
John Edwards having made it the centerpiece of his candidacy.
149
Much recent media attention has also focused on the show-down
between the Bush Administration and Congress over expanding
health insurance coverage to children through the S-CHIP pro-
gram, with the White House winning the war thus far by exercising
the presidential veto.1 0 The S-CHIP dispute has echoes of Dan-
dridge, which highlighted the purported conservative concern
about the danger of government treating welfare poor people more
favorably than working poor people. So it is especially revealing
that, in the current S-CHIP debate, noticeably absent are expres-
sions of Dandridge-like concerns about equality between some
working people who are very poor and receive health care benefits
and other working people who are relatively poor but lack health
tures of institutional life. Simply put, people cannot defy institutions to which they
have no access, and to which they make no contribution." Id. at 23. For an overview
of scholarly literature about law and organizing, see Loretta Price & Melinda Davis,
Seeds of Change: A Bibliographic Introduction to Law and Organizing, 26 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 615 (2000-2001).
148. Piven & Cloward did not judge the welfare rights movement a failure because
it failed to build a lasting movement. Instead, in their words: "Rather, we judge it by
another criterion: whether it exploited the momentary unrest among the poor to ob-
tain the maximum concessions possible in return for the restoration of quiescence. It
is by that criterion that it failed." PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 8, at 353.
149. See, e.g., Matt Bai, The Poverty Platform, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2007, (Maga-
zine), at 66; David Brooks, Edwards, Obama, and the Poor, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2007,
at A23; David Leonhardt, Two Candidates, Two Fortunes, Two Distinct Views of
Wealth, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2007, at Al; Leslie Wayne, Edwards Embarks on Tour in
South to Focus on Poverty, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2007, at All. Although former Sena-
tor Edwards has withdrawn from the 2008 presidential race, analysts have credited
him with moving the other Democratic candidates to more detailed policy proposals
regarding, for example, universal health care. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, The Edwards
Effect, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2008, at A23.
150. See Robert Pear, Missteps on Both Sides Prevented Compromise on Children's
Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2007, at A23.
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insurance. Instead, conservatives focus on the danger of an ex-
panded welfare state, which they urge must be fought at all costs,
even if those who suffer the consequences are uninsured chil-
dren. 1 ' The denial of health insurance to children presents a mo-
bilization opportunity, given public support for such benefits. It is
also more apparent today that almost all poor people are working
and can no longer be academically divided between the welfare
poor and the working poor, and also it is clearer that the uninsured
are no longer limited to people who are very poor. The current
economic and political conditions surely create the basis for recog-
nition of a common struggle and formation of a common identity
that are helpful for movement mobilization.
Other signs suggest that the conditions might be right for mobil-
izing a movement to extend protection and inclusion to poor peo-
ple. For example, some states and local governments have taken
the lead in health care and various anti-poverty initiatives. To be-
gin to provide coverage for the nearly fifty million people who are
uninsured, 152 a few states are fulfilling their "laboratories of de-
mocracy" function by experimenting with various versions of uni-
versal health care,153 although they are struggling with how to pay
for it.154 An especially bright note is that advocates for poor peo-
ple have been involved directly in negotiations with state officials
to help design a program to keep the out-of-pocket costs as low as
possible, 155 and also have been urging state officials to assess and
151. See Paul Krugman, An Immoral Philosophy, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2007, at A17.
152. The most recent Census Bureau count puts the number at 47 million for 2006,
up dramatically from 44.8 million the prior year. Abby Goodnough, Census Shows a
Modest Rise in U.S. Income, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2007, at Al.
153. See Danny Hakim, Spitzer Plans Major Push to Extend Health Care, N.Y.
TIMES, July 11, 2007, at B1; Christopher Lee, Massachusetts Begins Universal Health
Care, WASH. POST, July 1, 2007, at A6; Kevin Sack, California Takes Big Step Toward
Universal Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2007, at A25.
154. See Kevin Sack, States' Widening of Health Care Hits Roadblocks, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 25, 2007, at Al (explaining that the California program is expected to exceed its
first year budget by at least $150 million).
155. See Pam Belluck, Massachusetts Agency Proposes Health Coverage That Most
Can Afford, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2007, at A14.
The proposal represents a carefully hammered-out compromise. Business
groups wanted to make sure that premiums for state-sponsored insurance
would not be too much less than the employee contributions to an em-
ployer's plan because they fear that people would flock to the government-
sponsored plans, driving up the cost to the state. Advocates for poor people
had wanted lower costs for more residents.
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learn directly from this experiment. 56 Some cities are taking ac-
tion as well, enacting living-wage ordinances15 7 and also working to
establish better methods for determining who is poor.18 Simulta-
neously, leaders of bar associations around the country are or-
ganizing a virtual movement of lawyers to push for greater Access
to Justice for poor people, or what is sometimes called a "Civil
Gideon. ' 159 As for poor people themselves, an authentic move-
ment of low-wage workers is becoming increasingly well-organ-
ized. 160 All of this is occurring as the economic inequality gap is
the largest since 1929161 and recession fears loom, which are likely
156. See Kevin Sack, Amid Health Care Debate, Massachusetts Faces Test, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 25, 2007, at A34 ("John E. McDonough, executive director of Health
Care for All, an advocacy group based here, said he found it breathtaking that politi-
cal leaders were calling for an individual mandate well before there was any way to
measure the success of the Massachusetts experiment.").
157. See HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 15, at 326 ("Thirteen states (includ-
ing the District of Columbia) have increased the minimum wage above the federal
level; three more states have it under serious consideration .... At the current mini-
mum wage, a full-time worker earns only $10,712 per year .... Current rates allow
employers to exploit the lack of bargaining power of the low-wage worker.") (cita-
tions omitted).
158. Leslie Kaufman, Bloomberg Seeks a Modern Way to Determine Who Is Poor in
the City, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2007, at A21.
159. See, e.g., Beverly Balos, Domestic Violence Matters: The Case For Appointed
Counsel in Protective Order Proceedings, 15 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 557, 557
(2006) (arguing that due process requires that victims of domestic violence be ap-
pointed counsel); Howard H. Dana, Jr., Introduction: ABA 2006 Resolution on Civil
Right to Counsel, 15 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REV. 501, 501, 505 (2006) (describing
the unanimously adopted ABA resolution urging states to provide lawyers for poor
people in civil proceedings involving "shelter, sustenance, safety, health, or child cus-
tody" as "a first step" that "is intended to engender broader discourse about equal
justice in our nation within the organized bar, among the general public and by policy
makers").
160. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 23, at 281. I hasten to add that Professor Gordon
has a different take on the questions of rights advocacy. As she summarizes:
For at least the last quarter of the twentieth century, activist lawyers and
legal scholarship have been plagued by questions about whether lawyers in-
evitably dominate and derail collective action, and whether law has much if
anything to offer to social change. I have a sense that the tide has turned.
As a quiet but persistent chorus of voices maintained all along, we seem to
be reaching a consensus that there is little use in asking questions about law
and organizing in grand or abstract terms. The real issue is, what kind of
lawyers, in what kind of relationships with community groups or movements,
using what sorts of strategies, make sense in which contexts?
Id. at 294-95.
161. See Editorial, It Didn't End Well Last Time, N.Y. TIMES, April 4, 2007, at A14.
Not since the Roaring Twenties have the rich been so much richer than eve-
ryone else. In 2005, the latest year for which figures are available, the top 1
percent of Americans-whose average income was $1.1 million a year-re-
ceived 21.8 percent of the nation's income, their largest share since 1929.
Over all, the top 10 percent of Americans-those making more than about
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to bring the kind of destabilization that then creates the structural
opportunity for mobilization.
As for claiming rights, some dormant potential remains for using
even the existing unequal constitutional framework to benefit poor
people. First, the Supreme Court has formally conceded that con-
stitutional limitations do apply to regulation of poverty.
162  Of
course, the challenge remains to get the courts actually to conduct
at least meaningful rationality review,163 rather than engage in cat-
egorical exclusion and reflexive rationality review that repeats the
most deferential mantras164 followed in quick succession by the
conclusion that the regulation must be presumed to be rational and
therefore, must be upheld.
$100,000 a year-collected 48.5 percent, also a share last seen before the
Great Depression.
Id.; David Cay Johnston, Income Gap Is Widening, Data Shows, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29,
2007, at C1. The income inequality not only continues, but at a furious pace, accord-
ing to recent research by economists Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez. See also
Daniel Gross, Income Inequality, Writ Larger, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2007, at C7 ("the
share of gross personal income of the top 1 percent of American earners rose to 17.4
percent in 2005 from 8.2 percent in 1980."). The reporter summarized an explanation
provided by economists Frank Levy and Peter Temin:
Professor Levy and Professor Temin divide the second half of the 20th cen-
tury into two periods. In the first, 1955 to 1980, a grand bargain between
labor and corporate America involving New Deal-era protections for work-
ers and high marginal tax rates (the top rate was 90 percent in the 1950s) led
to what economists have called the Great Moderation. The middle class
grew dramatically, income inequality decreased, and corporations generally
enjoyed labor peace. Since 1980, they argue, it's been a different story,
thanks in part to a shifting political environment. Unions have weakened,
the minimum wage hasn't come close to keeping up with inflation, and mar-
ginal income tax rates have been cut-the top marginal rate is now 36 per-
cent, down from 70 percent in 1980. A result has been declining bargaining
power for workers and the rise of a winner-take-all environment.
Id.
162. See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469-70 (1977) ("The Constitution im-
poses no obligation on the States to pay the pregnancy-related medical expenses of
indigent women, or indeed to pay any of the medical expenses of ... indigents. But
when a State decides to alleviate some of the hardships of poverty by providing medi-
cal care, the manner in which it dispenses benefits is subject to constitutional
limitations.").
163. See Hershkoff, supra note 10, at 1153 ("The prevalent understanding of ration-
ality review-and its most potent criticism-posits that rationality review is not re-
view at all, but rather the withholding of review, indicating a refusal to expend
resources on issues that the judiciary locates outside the constitutional domain.").
164. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993) (reiterating that rational-basis re-
view in equal protection analysis "'is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom,
fairness, or logic of legislative choices."' (quoting FCC v. Beach Communications,
Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993)).
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Second, perhaps because poverty has not been treated as a sus-
pect classification, the government has made little to no effort to
hide its intent to target poor people for differential treatment, thus
leaving poverty classifications rather plainly apparent in many so-
cial or economic regulations. In other words, the singling out of
poor people frequently happens on the face of the law. When the
singling out of a group is facial, there is no need for plaintiffs to
prove that the regulation has any disparate impact or for the courts
to check for a discriminatory intent behind the regulation. 165
Third, because the courts have subjected classifications relating
to poverty only to rationality review, any classification designed to
benefit people based on their poverty would receive rationality re-
view as well.166 In other words, affirmative action based on class
would be upheld much more easily than affirmative action based
on race (which is subjected to strict scrutiny) 167 or based on sex
(which is subjected to intermediate scrutiny).168
Finally, another possibility is to use state constitutions to build
gradual momentum that the Supreme Court will notice and con-
sider when interpreting the United States Constitution. 169 Some
165. Of course, poor people most likely will get rationality review regardless
whether the method of discrimination is based on facial classification or disparate
impact because all types of disparate impact receive only rationality review unless the
plaintiffs can prove that the discrimination was intentional. See, e.g., Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (applying rationality review, rather than strict scrutiny, for
disparate racial impact without proof of intent); Personnel Adm'r of Massachusetts v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (applying rationality review, rather than intermediate
scrutiny, for disparate gender impact without proof of intent) Nonetheless, the gen-
eral persuasion process seems somewhat less arduous for obvious facial classifications.
166. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, Sec'y of Transp., 515 U.S. 200,
226 (1995) (subjecting benign racial classifications, for example, affirmative action, to
the same strict scrutiny used for harmful racial classifications (citing Regents of Univ.
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298 (1978)).
167. Id.
168. See, e.g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977) (subjecting benign sex
or gender classifications, for example, affirmative action, to the same intermediate
scrutiny used for harmful sex or gender classifications).
169. State constitutions contain a variety of types of provisions that could protect
social welfare rights, including directly establishing a government duty of aid to poor
people, designating a government entity to provide such aid, and articulating an aspi-
ration of eliminating poverty and assuring economic justice. See, e.g., AL. CONST. art.
I, § 88 ("It shall be the duty of the legislature to require the several counties of this
state to make adequate provision for the maintenance of the poor."); IL. CONST.
pmbl. ("We, the People of the State of Illinois ... in order to ... eliminate poverty
and inequality; assure legal, social and economic justice ... do ordain and establish
this Constitution for the State of Illinois."); N.C. CONST. art. XI, § 4 ("Beneficent
provision for the poor, the unfortunate, and the orphan is one of the first duties of a
civilized and a Christian state. Therefore the General Assembly shall provide for and
define the duties of a board of public welfare."); N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1 ("The aid,
668
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scholars have argued that state constitutions include language that
is directly, or at least indirectly, protective of social welfare.17 0 The
Supreme Court has taken notice of the success of other social
movements in accomplishing a changed interpretation of state con-
stitutions and then relied on such "emerging awareness" in chang-
ing its interpretation of the United States Constitution.17 1 The
school finance movement, for example, appears to be following this
approach on behalf of poor people with some success at the state
level.
Perhaps this is a particularly good time to re-imagine a society
with constitutional protection for poor people. Might we now chal-
lenge the dual rules of law as unconstitutional? Might we insist on
inclusion of poor people in our constitutional and political dia-
logues? 172 Might we insist on equal protection from discrimination
and equal enforcement of established constitutional rights for poor
people? The poverty context itself makes deciding the question of
care and support of the needy are public concerns and shall be provided by the state
and by such of its subdivisions, and in such manner and by such means, as the legisla-
ture may from time to time determine."); W.V. CONST. art. IX, § 2 ("Coroners, over-
seers of the poor and surveyors of roads, shall be appointed by the county court.").
170. See Karen Syma Czapanskiy, Why Does It Matter Where I Live? Welfare Re-
form, Equal Protection, and the Maryland Constitution, 63 MD. L. REV. 655, 662
(2004) (arguing Maryland's "rational basis with bite" standard should apply to that
state's double devolution of welfare policy and concluding that allowing county gov-
ernments to set different welfare policies would violate the state's equal protection
clause by treating residents differently based solely on where they reside); Hershkoff,
supra note 10, at 1143 ("state constitutional welfare clauses, of which New York's
Article XVII is an illustrative example, require state governments to achieve pre-
scribed social goals that the state judiciaries must enforce."); Randal S. Jeffrey, Equal
Protection in State Courts: The New Economic Equality Rights, 17 LAW & INEQ. 239,
356 (1999) (arguing that "recognition by state courts of economic equality rights in
school financing and abortion funding cases can potentially expand into other sub-
stantive areas of economic equality rights. Such areas include those in which the fed-
eral Supreme Court has declined to guarantee equality, including welfare, housing,
and employment."); Burt Neuborne, State Constitutions and the Evolution of Positive
Rights, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 881 (1989) (exploring the potential of state constitutional
poverty protection).
171. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571-72 (2003).
172. Might we also insist on dialogue about the fair treatment of wage income as
compared to investment income in the tax code? See Editorial, The Tax Debate That
Isn't, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2007, at A40; see also Dorothy A. Brown, Race and Class
Matters in Tax Policy, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 790 (2007). Maybe even revisit the social
welfare rights question, at least in the guise of discussing the negative income tax?
See, e.g., Robert H. Frank, The Other Milton Friedman: A Conservative With a Social
Welfare Program, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2006, at C3 (explaining Milton Friedman's
proposal that existing welfare programs should be replaced with single cash transfers
to eligible citizens).
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whether to pursue a potentially generative rights strategy or to
avoid the serious risks such a strategy would entail an easy call
precisely because poor people have everything to gain both consti-
tutionally and politically, and, unfortunately, very little to lose.
CONCLUSION
While the Constitution currently offers no hope for protection of
social welfare rights, the lack of social welfare rights is only the
most obvious of the constitutional injuries poor people suffer. This
Article has traced how the Supreme Court otherwise has deconsti-
tutionalized Poverty Law by four departures from normal constitu-
tional doctrine: first, by categorical immunization of "social or
economic legislation" from any likelihood of invalidation; second,
by circumvention of suspect class or classification analysis; third, by
application of rationality review in a reflexive manner to uphold
governmental regulation; and fourth, by reversal of heightened
scrutiny normally used for protection of established fundamental
rights.
Not only are poor people denied equal constitutional protection,
but also they lack the financial clout necessary to achieve political
protection. This exclusion of poor people from both constitutional
and political protection has contributed to the construction and
perpetuation of dual rules of law, one superior set of rules for the
economic haves and an inferior set of rules for the economic have-
nots. As a practical matter, this constitutional impoverishment
leaves Poverty Law itself as a frontier where government roams
free from accountability, experimenting with the work and family
lives of poor people as a means to the greater goal of reducing the
welfare state, and meanwhile ensuring the availability of labor at a
rate that is relatively reduced and continuously decreasing.
Constitutional theory and social movement mobilization scholar-
ship, taken together, explain that the dialogic default on the ques-
tion of economic justice both causes and reflects this lack of
constitutional rights for poor people. Without inclusion in the pub-
lic dialogue, little hope can be mustered toward establishing the
constitutional inclusion of poor people. It is precisely the mutually
reinforcing power of mobilizing political support and claiming legal
rights that together can produce traction toward achieving consti-
tutional inclusion. As the efforts to organize and advocate for poor
people in the political sphere continue, the time has come to
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harness the hope embedded in our constitutional ideals to re-imag-
ine and realize a unitary rule of law that gives equal constitutional
protection to both the haves and the have-nots.
AS!
